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ABSTRACT
Theimpacts of four major tax reform proposals on the level of interest
rates and the allocation of the American capital stock are derived. The four
plans are Bradley—Gephardt, Kemp—Kasten, Treasury I and Treasury II. The
allocation is among seven types of nonresidential capital, rentalhousing, and
owner occupied housing held by households in five different income classes.







Tax Reform, Interest Rates and Capital Allocation
Patric H. Hendershott
Four major tax reform proposals have been advanced recently: the
Bradley—Gephardt plan, the Kemp—Kasten proposal, and the Treasury—Department
plans I and II. These are comprehensive proposals likely to have significant
impacts on investment and real capital allocation. The impacts will reflect
both the direct effect of statutory tax changes and the indirect effects
elicited by changes in interest rates and incomes. This paper estimates the
impacts of tax changes on interest rates and capital allocation, holding income
constant.
Supply—siders believe that the lowering of marginal tax rates will
increase real income and Treasury tax revenue by inducing greater work effort
and saving. While virtually all economists accept this argument in principle,
many, if not most, believe the magnitude of these responses to be small. We
have not modeled such responses and effectively assume that the tax reforms are
revenue neutral and will not alter either the level or distribution of after—
tax income.1 (While households receive a tax cut on average, the tax increase
for businesses will result in lower real returns to some factor of production
and thus to households who own all factors.)
This paper begins with a general discussion of rental user costs for real
capital, the primary determinants of capital allocation, and then presents
calculations of the user costs under current law. Section II contains a
description of the allocation simulation model, and analyses of the four tax
reform proposals, including their inflation neutrality, are reported in Section
III. The model contains seven types of nonresidential capital, rental housing
and owner—occupied housing. Households in six income classes with endogenous—2—
tenure choices are considered. A given capital sLock is allocated among the
various capital components, with the level of interest rates adjusting to
maintain aggregate demand equal to the fixed stock.
We conclude that interest rates would decline significantly in response
to all reforms except Kemp—Kasten: three percentage points if Treasury I were
enacted, two points in response to Bradley.-Gephardt, and one point if Treasury
II were passed. A final section suggests that significant positive saving
interest rate elasticities, both domestic and foreign, might reduce the
declines under Treasury I and Bradley—Gephardt by a percentage point.
I. Investment Hurdle Rates or User Costs
General Considerations
As is well known (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967), the decision to invest
depends on whether the present value of the expected revenue from investment
exceeds the supply price of capital, and on marginal investments the two will




where Tisthe business tax rate, p is the gross marginal product of capital,
r is the real after—tax financing rate, d is the economic depreciation rate,
Tisthe concurrent equivalent tax rate on inflationary gains, iiisthe
expected inflation rate, and k is the investment tax credit.2 In general, z is
the present value of the stream of tax depreciation allowances,
TAXDEPt,
obtained by discounting the stream of depreciation allowances by the required




whereN is the depreciation period of the asset. The right side of equation
(1) is the "investment hurdle rate" or rental user cost for a particular asset.
The lower the user cost, the greater will be production of the asset, and the
lower will be the productivity of the marginal investment (p).
In a "neutral" tax system, the net user and thus net marginal
productivities (p —d)would be the same for all equally—risky assets. This
can be achieved in a variety of ways. For example, with k =0, -t= 0and
either z =1——expensing——or-r =0,then p —d=r.Alternatively, with k =
0,-r=0and z =d/(r+ d) ——taxdepreciation equal to economic depreciation,
then p —d=r/(l—t).Ineither case, if the r's were equal for all assets,
the tax system would be neutral across them.3
Assuming that firms use a fixed fraction of debt, b, for financing all
investments, the real after—tax financing rate can be expressed as
r [b(l—$-r)i + (1—b) (l—y-r)e —ir]/(l+ir), (3)
where and y-,respectively,are the portions of interest and equity returns
that are deductible at the business level, and e is the required nominal return
to investors. (Currently=1and y =0.)
Portfolio equilibrium of investors requires that
(l_Te)e =(l—x)i+, (4)
where
eis the rate at which equity returns are taxed at the personal level,
x is the relevant tax rate for taxable interest (the lower of the personal tax
rate and that implicit in tax—exempt yields) , andis the risk premium—4—
required on equity investments. For all investments except owner—occupied
housing of low and middle income households, x is the tax rate implicit in
tax—exempt yields x. Substituting (4) into (3), the real after—tax financing
rate for capital other than owner—occupied housing is:
(l—x )i + S
r=[b(l—61)i+(1—b)(i—IT)
e —T]/(l+). (3') 1— Te
If TIwereequal to T(whichwould be true if I =T=0)and xr, r e e
would equal [(l—T)i —÷ (l—b)]/(l+ir) for all assets. Further, if all
interest expense were deductible at the same rate and all investments were
equally risky, all r's would be equal.
All interest expense is not deductible at the same rate, the clearest
example being owner—occupied housing. Because this asset is held by households
with a wide range of income subject to the full array of marginal personal tax
rates, the tax rates at which interest is deductible (and at which equity the
owner has in the house would have been taxed had the household rented) vary
across households. More generally, the real after—tax financing rate for the
jth household is
r. ={b.(l—tji+(l—b,)(l—x)i—ir—]/(l+ir). (5)
J J J J J J
The tax rate applicable to own equity investment, x,, is defined as the minimum





The sur, allows the tax rate on the last dollar of interest earned to exceed
J
the rate at which the last dollar of interest expense is deductible (t.)
,and
reflects the potential only partial taxation of interest income. (Under
current law, sur, =0and=1.)Finally, loan—to—value ratios will vary.
depending on the relative after tax costs of debt and own equity financing.
The greater is x., the lower will b. be.
J J
The above r's are appropriate for computation of the user cost relevant
to the quantity of housing demanded by homeowners, but not tothe decision of
householdswhether to own or rent. The .'s and x's appropriate for the user
cost relevant to the tenure decision depend on the average rates at which
interest for the entire house purchase is deducted and on which the entire
owner—equity investment would have been taxed (Hendershott and Slemrod, 1983).
User Costs Under Current Law
Under current law, net income (imputed rents) from owner—occupied housing
is not taxed and no depreciation is deductible [the T'S in equation (I)are
zero). However, property taxes on owner—occupied housing are deductible and
thus the tax saving from these taxes on a dollar of housing (assuming a
property tax rate of 0.012) is subtracted from the right side of (1). For
corporations T= 0.4924;for noncorporate business (excluding owner occupied
housing) ,T istaken to be the maximum tax rate on personal interest,Tim =
0.53.Each of thesevalues reflects an assumed maximum state and local tax
rate of 0.06 which is deductible at the federal level.—6—
Theinvestment tax credit, k, equals 0.06 for 3 year equipment, 0.10for
longerlived equipment and public utility structures, and zero for other
structures; the inflation tax, T,isO.7-r for inventories, because FIFO
accounting is used for 70 percent of inventories, and is close to zero for
other assets. Also, equipment is depreciated for tax purposes at 150% of
declining balance over tax lives of 3 or 5 years; structures are depreciated
at 175% of declining balance over 10, 15 or 18 years; and inventories are
effectively depreciated for tax purposes upon sale or one and a half months
after purchase, on average.
For corporations, tdependson the taxation of dividends and capital
gains and the division of equity raised between new issues and retained
earnings (Fullerton, 1985). More generally,
=nt + (l—n)T , (7) e div cg
where n is the proportion of equity funds raised by new issues,Tdi is the tax
rate on dividends and
Tcg
is the tax rate on equity capital gains. We assume n
=0.1; t =T./2; and =O.4T./4 under current law, where T. is the div im cg im im
maximum tax rate on personal interest. The 0.4 is unity less the statutory
sixty percent capital gains exclusion. The divisions by 2 and 4 allow for tax
deferral and avoidance activities. Thus T =Ol4-r..Fornoncorporate e
businesses (including households investing in owner—occupied housing), t
equals 0.
Empirically, the tax rate implicit in tax—exempt yields varies with the
maturity of the security. For short—term tax exempts, the ratio of prime grade
tax—exempt to risk—free taxable yields has not deviated far from unity less the
corporate tax rate or roughly 0.5. For ten—year bonds, which are more relevant
for the long—term investments being analyzed, the ratio has been closer to 0.7.—7—
The implicit tax rate of 0.3, rather than the federal tax rate of 0.46 (the
state and local tax rate is not relevant if corporations invest in their own
jurisdictions), reflects a number of factors, but the most important is likely
the tax saving from optimally trading bonds (taking capital losses and
deferring capital gains).4 This is especially important because high
transactions costs virtually eliminate any gains from trading municipal bonds.
The tax rate implicit in long—term tax exempt yields is assumed to be given by:
x =(—O.3)T, (8) e i
where is the federal corporate tax rate and the 0.3 measures the gains from
optimal trading.
In our analysis of owner—occupied housing, we consider households at five
different income levels (column 1 of Table 1) in order to deduce the tax rates
that are representative of households in five income ranges: $12,500 to
$25,000, $25,000 to $30,000, $30,000 to $50,000, $50,000 to $100,000 and over
$100,000. The federal and state and local tax rates relevant to the quantity—
demanded decision are listed in columns 2 and 3 (the marginal federal rate
jumps near the middle of two ranges), and the total tax rate ——thefederal
plus the state times one minus the federal ——isshown in column 4. For the
highest income class, x, =O.7Tf
=0.322.For the other classes, the x. equal
the T.shownin the table. The last column is the tax rate relevant to the
J
tenure choice (a weighted average of the average tax rates applied to debt and
equity) .Thesetax rates are discussed in more detail in Hendershott and Ling,
1985.—8—
For all investments other than real estate, b =1/3.For real estate
investments other than owner—occupied housing, b2/3. For owner—occupied
housing, we vary b. depending on the relative attractiveness of debt and equity
financing. More specifically,
0.5 if x r.
b. =0.667if = (9)
0.85 if
J J
The minimum 0.5 reflects an assumed average wealth constraint on households;
the optimal b, for unconstrained households is likely zero.
The assumed loan—to—value ratios far exceed the 0.33 to 0.4 average
economy—wide ratio observed for owner—occupied housing. Such ratios are
heavily influenced by older owning households who have repaid their mortgages.5
These are relatively insensitive to housing rental costs (see note 11).
Households under forty use far more debt (the average loan—to—value ratio for
first—time homebuyers in 1984 was 87 percent) and often make quite long—term
housing decisions. It is the decisions of such households that we are
attempting to capture, and their present—value weighted average loan—to—value
ratio is probably near two—thirds.
Based upon Ibbotson—Sinquefield calculations, we assume 1forcorporate
equities is 0.075, and thus the risk premium for corporate assets, which have a
one—third loan—to—value ratio, is (l—b) =0.05.The risk premium for
depreciable real estate investors is also about 0.075.6 Because real—estate
assets are presumed to have a loan—to—value ratio of two—thirds, the premium,
for these assets is only 0.025. We assume this also to be the premium for
owner—occupied housing. This relatively low premium is consistent with owners
having certainty with regard to their "vacancy" and "breakage" rates and thus
greater certainty with respect to their net operating incomes than is the case
with rental properties.—9—
The risk—adjusted net (of depreciation) investment hurdle rates for
alternative investments are reported in Table 2 for three different inflation
rates. In the base case,=0.05and I =0.11.We also consider higher
(0.10) and lower (0.0) inflation rates. The interest rates associated with
these inflation rates were generated by the model described in the next
section. As can be seen, di/dir =1.48,midway between the nontax (unity) and
tax [di/dii l/(l—T)--2] Fisherian values.7
Under a neutral tax system, these rates would be the same for all assets,
As can be seen, this is not true under current law. At a five percent
inflation rate, the tax—favored assets are equipment, with its generous tax
credit, and housing, especially that occupied by high—income households. The
tax—penalized assets are inventories, whose inflationary gains are not indexed,
and corporate structures, especially industrial structures which receive no tax
credit. Also, corporate investments are penalized relative to noncorporate,
owing to their double taxation, and risky assets are penalized relative to less
risky real estate assets (Bulow and Suiimers, 1984) 8 The difference in hurdle
rates for industrial structures and housing, on average, is 4½ percentage
points. The difference in the cost of housing for high and low income owners
is over 3 percentage points. Moreover, the higher is inflation, the greater
are the biases in favor of rental and high—income owner housing and is the
penalty against corporate investments.
II. The Capital Allocation Model9
An Overview
The basic model allocates a fixed private capital stock among various
classes of nonresidential and residential capital. The allocation depends on
the rental or user costs for the capital components, the price elasticities of
demand with respect to the rental costs, and the elasticities of homeownership—10—
with respect to the cost of owning versus renting. The interest rate adjusts
in response to tax changes so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital
at its initial level. The fixed capital stock assumption implies zero interest
elasticity of saving.
Table 3 lists the distribution of the U.S. capital stock at the end of
1983 by type. A number of simplifying assumptions are made in the construction
of the model. Because well over 90 percent of inventories are held by
corporations and nearly 90 percent of rental housing is held by noncorporate
business, we assume that each of these assets is held totally by corporate and
noncorporate business, respectively. While equipment is depreciable over 3 or
5 years, about 95 percent of it is classified as 5—year. We treat all
equipment as 5—year.'° Because public utility structures (which are virtually
all corporate) are depreciated over a shorter life that other structures and
are eligible for the investment tax credit, they are treated separately. With
these assumptions and distinctions, the capital shares are those listed in the
percent share column.
Current law treats owner—occupied housing differently depending upon the
tax position of the owner, with higher income households paying a lower rental
cost owing to their lower after—tax financing rate. Thus it is necessary to
distribute the owner—occupied housing stock across households at different
income levels. The distribution depends upon the number of owners within each
income range as well as the income range and the rental costs for each of the
ranges.
For all assets except rental housing, the demand for the asset is
determined by the investor in the asset, be it a corporation, unincorporated
business or a household. For rental housing, demand is determined by renters,—11-.
based upon their incomes and the market rent level. Thus, the total quantity
of rental housing, like the total quantity of owner housing, is built up as the
sumofthe demands by households in different income brackets.
Table 4 indicates divisions of the demand for housing across six income
classes. The first three columns contain the income classes selected, the
division of 80 million households across these classes, and the assumed
ownership rates for these classes. Columns 4 and 5 give the distribution of
the income of owners and renters across these classes. Column 4 is the product
of columns 1, 2 and 3 divided by the sum of the products. In the column 5
calculation, the fraction of households owning is replaced by the fraction
renting. Columns 6 and 7 give the distribution of the owned and rented stocks.
These distributions and the ownership rates were calculated from model
equations described below. The equations imply an aggregate ownership rate of
0.56, significantly below the current observed rate which is heavily influenced
by tenure decisions made during the 1970s when the cost of owning was far lower
than today because real after—tax mortgage rates were so much lower. Put
another way, if real after—tax mortgage rates remain at the early l980s level,
we would anticipate a significant decline in the aggregate ownership rate over
time (holding demographic factors constant) .Giventhat ownership rates do
not reflect a long run equilibrium, the distribution of the housing stock
between owned and rented also does not. The assumed equilibrium distribution
is that shown in Table 4, not that in Table 1. That is,. 10 percent of the
existing owner—occupied housing stock f(2269—2032)/2269]has been shifted from
owner to rental.
Model Equations
The model explains 13 rental costs: seven for the different types of
nonresidential capital, five for owner—occupied housing of households in our
five income ranges, and one for rental housing. As discussed in the previous—12—
section, these costs depend on numerous provisions of the tax law, the
depreciation rate of the asset, the expected inflation rate and the level of
interest rates in the economy. Moreover, rental costs for household tenure
choice decisions (s,)differfrom those for quantity demanded decisions (p.)
because the tax rates relevant to the after—tax financing rates differ (see







Thereare seven demand equations for nonresidential capital (NK):
corporate inventories, corporate and noncorporate 5—year equipment, 10— and
15—year public utility structures, and other corporate (industrial) and
noncorporate (commercial) structures. Assuming that production functions are
Cobb—Douglass [Berndt(1976)], these demand equations can be written as
NKk =Zk/pk, (19)—(25)
where the Zk are constants (depending on given outputs) and the are the
rental costs.
The housing demand and tenure choice equations come from the
specification of a translog indirect utility function for households (King,
1980) and the empirical application of it to the ownership decision




Taking antilogs and solving, the ownership rates for the five highest income
classes are
0, =eLj/(l_eLj), (26)-(30)
where the L. equal the right—hand side of the log [o./(L..oj] expression. The
ownership rate for the lowest income class is assumed to be zero.
There are also five demand equations for owner housing and six for rental
housing based on our six income classes, the lowest of which consists solely of
renters. These demands are the products of the demands per owning/renting
household and the number of ownino/renting households. The specific form of
the equations comes from application of Roy's identity to the indirect utility
function and substitution from the estimated odds of owning equation. For
owner housing (OH), the demand equations are
OH.o,HH,Z(3.846 + .766 log p i/p., (31)—(35)
where 0, is the ownership rate for the jth class, HH. is the number of
households in the jth class, and the Z, are constants which are proportional to
the incomes of representative households in the classes. For rental households
(RH), the equations are
RH. =(l—0JFIH.Z.(3.846+ .766 log p)/p, (36)—(41)
3 3 JJ—14—
where P' the user cost for rental housing, is the rental price facing all
households -
Lastly,equality between the sum of the demands and the existing capital
stock determines the level of interest rates in the economy:
NK +OH.+RH.=K. (42)
j
Given current tax law and assumed levels of the interest and expected
inflation rates, the k' p., ,andp are known (listed, net of the d's in
Table 2). The NK were listed in Table 3, and the OH. and RH. calculations k j j
were reported in Table 4. The o. and HH, were also listed in Table 4. The Z
J j k
can be calculated under current law from equations (19)—(25); the Z. are
proportional to the incomes of the representative households in the classes and
are scaled such that the sum of the demands for owner and rental housing equals
the total existing housing stock of 2892 billion dollars.
III. Analysis of Alternative Tax Regimes
The impact of four tax reforms on the level of interest rates, rental
costs, and capital shares are calculated in this section. We begin with an
analysis of the reforms, consider the impacts on the net user costs (p—d's) and
the interest rate, and then turn to the capital stock effects. This analysis
effectively assumes zero saving response. Other saving assumptions are
considered in a final section.
Tax Reform Proposals
Table 5 lists the important business tax parameters for current law and
the four tax reform plans. All reforms lower the corporate tax rate (and the
maximum personal tax rate, see Table 6) and eliminate the investment tax
credit. Proposed capital gains taxation and tax depreciation changesvary—15—
widely, however. Bradley—Gephardt treats these items less favorably than
current law: capital gains would be taxed at the regular income tax rate which
translates into a 30 percent rate vis—a—vis the current 20 percent, and tax
depreciation lives would be increased significantly, 40 years for structures
rather than the current 18 and 10 years for equipment rather than the current
5. Even with greater acceleration (250%DB versus l75%DB), first year tax
deductions for structures would decline from 10 percent to 6 percent and for
equipment the decline would be from 30 to 25 percent. Kemp—Kasten would treat
capital gains and tax depreciation far more generously than either current law
or the other proposals. On capital gains, a choice would exist, the options
being nominal gains taxed at 60% of the lowered regular rate or only real gains
taxed at regular rates. Moreover, property investments could be effectively
written off entirely in the year of purchase. Nonfinancial neutrality would
then exist for depreciable properties because p—d would equal r for all such
assets.
Treasury I attempts to neutralize the tax system for inflation by
indexing everything. Only real capital gains, including those in inventories,
would be taxed ( =0),depreciation would be on a replacement, rather than
historic, cost basis, and only the "real" part of interest expense would be
taxed and could be deducted.'2 Treasury I also attempts to tax all assets and
business forms (except owner—occupied housing) equally. To this end, tax
depreciation for each depreciable asset would equal the Treasury's best
estimate of true economic depreciation, the investment tax credit would be
dropped, real capital gains would be taxed at the regular income tax rate, and
half of corporate dividends would be deductible at the corporate level. The
indexation of inventory gains, the removal of the tax credit, and the proposed
tax depreciation treatment would result in p—d equaling r/(l—-r) for all—16—
properties except owner—occupied housing, and the partial dividend exclusion
would reduce discrepancies between the r's for corporate andnoncorporate
investments.
Treasury II retreats from these principles in significant respects: all
interest would continue to be deductible, investors innondepreciable assets
would have the option of paying taxes on nominal capitalgains at one—half of
the regular income tax rate, tax depreciation would exceed economic
depreciation, and only one—tenth of dividends would be deductible. Tax
depreciation would be especially generous for equipment that continues to be
classified as 3 or 5 years and for public utility structures; allowable
depreciation would exceed that under current law even at zero inflation.
However, most 5—year equipment would be reclassified as 6,7 and even 10year
equipment. For industrial structures, tax depreciation would bemore favorable
only at inflation rates of 6 percent or greater.
Table 6 contains tax rates relevant to household behavior. Thenumbers
for the different income levels in the table are the taxrates relevant to the
quantity—demanded and tenure—choice (in parentheses) decisions. The maximum
rates at the bottom of the table are the assumed marginal ratesat which
interest income and corporate equity are taxed, and therates implicitly built
into tax—exempt yields. The income tax rates reflect thedeductibility of a
0.06 state and local income tax rate under current law andBradley—Gephardt, but
the nondeductibility under Kemp—Kasten and theTreasury plans.
From equation (7) and the surrounding discussion,T is a weighted average
of T./2 (one—tenth weight) and the capital gains taxrate (nine—tenths weight),
(l—excl)'r./4 where excl is the capital gains exclusion. The exclusionsare:
0.6 (current law), 0.0 (Bradley—Gephardt andTreasury I), 0.4 (Kemp—Kasteri) and
0.5 (Treasury II). The tax rate implicit intax—exempt yields is defined by
Xe
= (3—O.3)Tf.—17--
The own—equity financing rates and loan—to—value ratios for owner—occupied
housing are fully specified by equations (6), (7), and (9) and the provisions of
the reform proposals. For Bradley—Gephardt, the surtax applies to the three
highest income classes; thus own—equity financing (the tax—exempt interest rate
being the opportunity cost) is cheaper than debt financing and a 50 percent
loan—to—value ratio is assumed. The interest indexation feature ofTreasury I
(3< 1) would also have a major impact on the opportunity cost of own equity
financing generally (as well as on tax—exempt yields ——seenote d to Table 6
Because only 55%/38% of nominal interest income would be taxed in a five/ten
percent inflation world, the tax rate relevant to own equity financing would be
55%/38% of the marginal rates shown in Table 6 or the tax—exempt rate,
whichever is less.
The partial dividend exclusion is of little import in our model because
only 10 percent of equity financing is from new share issues on which dividends
are paid. (Dividends are saved initially by the the retention of earnings,
offsetting the future payment of dividends.) Thus y in the model is only 0.05
under Treasury I and 0.01 under Treasury II, 10 percent of the 50 and 10percent
exclusions, respectively.
Impacts on Interest Rates and Capital Allocation, 5% Inflation
Table 7 lists the present value of depreciation allowances (z) for
corporate and noncorporate (in parentheses) investments under current law and
the various reforms. The values reflect the depreciation rules, the assumed 5%
inflation rate (the depreciation base is indexed under the Treasury plans and
Kemp—Kasten), and the discount rates listed at the bottom of the table. The
differences in discount rates across assets for any given tax regimeprimarily
reflect two factors.13 For corporate and noncorporate equipment, the
differences are largely determined by the extent of taxation of equity returns—18—
at the personal level (the differences vary directly with T). For noncorporate
equipment and structures, the differences largely reflect the two and a half
percentage point difference in risk [(l—b) equals 0.025 for real estate and
0.05 for other assets]. The lower is the discount rate, the greater is the
present value of depreciation deductions, ceteris paribus.
Because the discount rates are quite similar across reforms, differences
in the z values across reforms are largely due to the generosity of the
depreciation allowances. Clearly, Kemp—Kasten is the most generous (its z's are
less than unity because the real after—tax discount rate implied by the model,
roughly 7 percent, on average, exceeds 3½ percent). Treasury II is close to
cuxrent law for 18 year structures, but more favorable for equipment and far
more favorable for public utilities. Both Treasury I and Bradley—Gephardt are
considerably less generous than current law.
Table 8 contains the level of interest rates and the various investment
hurdle rates under current law and the reforms. As can be seen, the reform—
induced decline in interest rates varies from 3 percentage points under Treasury
I, 2 points with Bradley—Gephardt, one point with Treasury II, to zero with
Kemp—Kasten. This variation contrasts markedly with the near equality of
after—tax discount rates across reforms listed in Table 7. The far higher level
of interest rates under Kemp—Kasten than under Treasury I follows directly from
their different methods of attempting to achieve tax neutrality across assets
with different lives. As was shown above, when neutrality is achieved by
expensing (Kemp—Kasten), the real after—tax interest rate equals the net
marginal products; when neutrality is obtained by setting tax depreciation
equal to true economic depreciation (Treasury I), the real after—tax interest
rate equals the net marginal products times one less the business tax rate.-19-
The biases inherent in current law when inflation is five percent were
discussed above. Whether the reforms would dampen them is of interest. All
reforms do reduce the bias in favor of equipment by removing the investment
tax credit, but some bias is still retained under Treasury II and
Kemp—Kasten owing to the indexed depreciation schedules in excess of economic
depreciation. The Treasury plans and Bradley—Gephardt would also more than
remove the bias against inventories, the Treasury plans through their
indexation of inventory gains and Bradley-Gephardt by its generally unfav-
orable treatment of depreciable assets. The bias in favor of utilities
4- 4- 1..41.- 4, .,1 1...-.. 4 -1-....l1.,... 14' 4-L.-4..-.,--.l-I- -I-... e± ,srn. .. aown., £emJ a. 0i uie me
credit, but the rental cost declines nevertheless under Kemp—Kasten and
especially Treasury II because of their relatively generous depreciation
allowances.
The plans differ the most, however, in their treatment of owner—occupied
housing. Under current law, the rental cost of this housing is over 3
percentage points higher for households with adjusted gross income of $17,500
than for households with AGI of $130,000. All reforms would narrow this
difference, but the spread is still nearly 2 percentage points under Treasury II
and 1½ points under Treasury I. With Bradley—Gephardt and Kemp—Kasten, the
spread is only one—third of a point.14 Treasury I would also sharply increase
the bias in favor of all owner—occupied housing by its indexation of interest
expense for all investments except owner—occupied housing, and Bradley—Gephardt
would increase the bias by its generally unfavorable treatment of depreciable
assets.
The data in Table 9 indicate how the capital stock would be reallocated
under the various reforms. These reallocations follow fairly directly from the
realignment of investment hurdle rates just discussed. Owing to the loss of the
investment tax credit, equipment and utilities would shrink under all plans,
except utilities would rise in response to the far more generous depreciation—20..
allowances in Treasury II. Industrial and commercial structures, in contrast,
would grown under all reforms except Treasury I. The Treasury I results are
driven by the exemption of home mortgage interest from the interest indexation
provision. This exemption, along with the 3 percentage point decline in
interest rates, raises the demand for owner—occupied housing by 28 percent, a
rise fueled by an 8 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate. While
rental housing is curtailed correspondingly, residential structures rise by 9
percent overall, crowding out other real capital. Treasury II and Kemp—Kasten
have virtually identical impacts, except for the distribution of corporate
structures between utilities and industrials; Bradley—Gephardt is similar to
Kemp—Kasten except that it generally favors real estate assets more and
corporate assets less.
The homeownership rate declines slightly under Treasury II and Kemp—
Kasten, with the declines being concentrated in the higher income classes where
the cut in marginal tax rates is greatest. The unchanged rate under Bradley—
Gephardt is the net result of significant increase in ownership by households
with incomes under $25,000 and decrease by those with incomes over $55,000.
Inflation Neutrality
Only Treasury I and Kemp—Kasten make serious attempts at achieving
inflation neutrality, the latter by proposing effective expensing of capital
outlays and the former by setting tax depreciation equal to economic
depreciation and indexing both depreciation allowances and interest. As can be
seen in Table 10, Kemp—Kasten comes close to achieving neutrality: no asset
other than inventories changes by more than one percent in response to a ten
percentage point increase in expected inflation, and the inventory change is
only —3 percent. With indexing of inventories, Kemp—Kasten would be inflation
neutral. The interest rate response to inflation is roughly the lId—i) one
would expect (the average r for Kemp—Kasten is about 0.3).—21—
Treasury I is far less successful in achieving neutrality. This failure
follows directly from the exclusion of home mortgage interest expense from the
interest indexation provision. As a result, the interest rate response to
inflation is greater than the unity one would expect in a fully interest—indexed
system, and the demand for business capital, especially double—taxed corporate
capital, falls. Because the interest rate increase is not sufficient to
maintain the real after—tax interest rate for owner—occupied housing [di/di
l/(l_rh) 'whereThisthe rate at which nominal home mortgage interest is
deductible], a significant increase in both the homeownership rate and the
quantity of housing demanded by owning households occurs.
Higher inflation is very negative for owner—occupied housing under current
law and would continue to be under Treasury II because the average tax rate at
which expenses are deductible is significantly less for owner housing than for
other capital. Thus, the real after—tax interest rate paid by owners tends to
rise, while that for other capital falls (see Titman, 1982) 15 This negative
impact would be dampened under the other reforms because the differential
between tax rates at which expenses are deductible would narrow (less by
Bradley—Gephardt, which allows mortgage interest deductibility at only the 14
percent rate, than under Kemp—Kasten). Nonetheless, both Treasury II and
Bradly—Gephardt are significantly more inflation neutral than current law.
The other major implication of Table 10 is the benefit of inflation for
less risky noncorporate depreciable real estate (commercial and rental
structures), relative to risky corporate depreciable properties. The double
taxation of corporate capital implies a greater increase in its financing rate
for a given increase in the interest rate than is the case for noncorporate
business. The relatively greater financing rate raises the rental cost both
directly and indirectly via reduced depreciation deductions in present value
terms.—22--
V. Supply of Capital Responses
The impacts of the reform proposals on interest rates reported above were
based upon the assumption of zero interest elasticity of savings or, more
accurately, of the supply of capital. Other assumptions are possible. The
implications of them are briefly explored here.
Summers (1981) has noted that infinite long—run interest rate elasticity
is implied by the pure life—cycle model when households have a strong bequest
motive. Under this assumption, the after—tax return to savers is fixed and thus
the new interest rate level (1 ) can be exnressed in terms of the pre—reform
level (I ) and the tax rates on saving before and after the enactment of the 0




To utilize this relation, the t's must be identified with a tax rate in
our model. Higher income households are less likely to be wealth constrained
than other households and are thus more likely to behave as the life—cycle model
suggests. Higher income households also do most of the saving in the U.S. and
hold most of the wealth. The natural counterpart for t in the model is thusx,
the tax rate implicit in tax—exempt yields. This is the after—tax risk—free
return to households with incomes above roughly $70,000 under current law and
all the reforms.
Table 11 lists the calculated interest rates under the various reforms for
two different methods of calculation. Column 1 summarizes the level of rates
provided by our capital allocation model (zero saving or supply of capital
response) .Column2 presumes that savings behavior maintains the real 10—year
tax—exempt yield. As can be seen, endogenous saving or supply behavior leads to—23—
interest rate declines roughly comparable to those obtained with the fixed—
capital model for all reforms except Kemp—Kasten. Thus for the Treasury plans
and Bradley—Gephardt, the percentage changes in the various capital components
would be quite similar in the case of endogenous saving to those presented
above.
With Kemp—Kasten, endogenous saving results in a percentage point decline
in rates; marginal tax rates are cut significantly and thus before tax interest
rates must decline to prevent after—tax interest rates from rising.16 In
contrast, the substantial investment incentives (depreciation and capital gains)
prevent the total demand for capital from falling, the quantity demanded would
increase in response to the decline in interest rates and thus all capital
components would tend to grow.
A further complicating factor in the determination of the impact of tax
reform on interest rates is the net foreign demand for U.S. capital. Unless
foreign countries cut their marginal tax rates on interest income or move their
interest rates pan passu with those in the U.S., a decline in U.S. interest
rates would represent a decline in after—tax returns to foreigners. As a result
capital would flow out of the U.S. and domestic interest rates would not need to
fall as much to bring the demand and supply of capital in the U.S. into balance.
In the extreme case of no adjustment in foreign taxes or interest rates and
perfectly elastic international capital flows, U.S. interest rates would not
fall at all but the U.S. capital stock would, the fall being greater the larger
is the decline in interest rates computed from the fixed—capital stock model. A
more balanced view would incorporate less than perfectly elastic capital flows
and significant changes in foreign interest rates in response to movements in
U.S. rates. Thus a fall in foreign demand for U.S. capital would tend to dampen
the decline in U.S. rates, but not eliminate it.—24—
For Treasury II and Kemp—Kasten, the domestic and foreign supply of
capital responses are offsetting. Because the decline in interest rates
necessary to maintain real after—tax interest returns to domestic savers is
greater than that generated by the fixed—capital model, interest rates will tend
to fall by more than the latter calculation and the U.S. capital stock would
tend to grow. On the other hand, any decline in U.S. rates induces a movement
of capital abroad which tends to limit the decline. Thus, the direction of bias
in the rate declines computed from the fixed—capital stock model is uncertain.
For Treasury I and Bradley—Gephardt, the domestic saving response (weakly)
reinforces the dampening influence of the foreign response, i.e., the level of
taxable interest rates necessary to maintain tax—exempt yields is higher than
that generated by the fixed capital stock model. We ran alternative simulations
for rate declines equal to two—thirds those produced by the fixed—capital model.
In these, the aggregate capital stock was determined endogenously as that
consistent with the imposed rates. The total capital stock fell by 7 percent in
the Treasury I simulation, where the interest rate was raised one percentage
point above the model determined level, and by 5 percent in the Bradley—Gephardt
simulation, where the interest rate was raised by two—thirds of a percentage
point. As a result, all capital components fell relative to the fixed—capital
simulations. Because the higher level of interest rates lowers the present
value of tax depreciation on longer—lived capital more than on shorter—lived
capital, the allocations of the lower capital stocks are tilted slightly more
toward shorter lived capital than are the allocations of the fixed capital
stock.—25—
vi. Summary
The paper begins with presentation of a methodology for computing rental
costs of capital under any tax regime. Current tax law is then specified and
rental costs are calculated. At a five percent inflation rate, the tax—favored
assets under current law are equipment, with its generous tax credit, and
housing, especially that occupied by high—income households. The tax—penalized
assets are inventories, whose inflationary gains are not indexed, and corporate
structures, especially industrial structures that receive no tax credit.Also,
corporate investments are penalized relative to noncorporate, owing to their
double taxation, and risky assets are penalized relative to less risky real
estate assets. The difference in hurdle rates for industrial structures and
housing, on average, is 4½ percentage points. The difference in the cost of
housing for high and low income owners is over 3 percentage points.
A model is then constructed to allow calculation of the impact of changes
in tax regimes and/or expected inflation on interest rates and the allocation of
real capital. The model allocatesfixed private capital stock amourig various
classes of nonresidential and residential capital, depending upon the rental
costs for the capital components, the price elasticities of demand with respect
to the rental costs, and the elasticities of homeownership with respect to the
cost of owning versus renting. The interest rate adjusts in response to tax
changes so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital at this initial
level. The fixed capital stock assumption implies zero interest elasticity of
saving.
The impacts of four tax reforms are then analyzed: Treasury I (TI)
Treasury II (TII), Bradley—Gephardt (BG) and Kemp—Kasten (KK). The greater are
the investment incentives of a tax plan, the higher is the level of interest
rates computed by the model. Accordingly, interest rates are unchanged in—26—
response to KK with its near expensing of depreciable capital, but decline
by a percentage point under TI, twopointsunder BG and three points under
Til with indexation of interest income andexpense(except home mortgage
interest).
All reforms reduce the current bias infavorof equipment by removing
theinvestment tax credit, but some bias is still retained under Treasury II
and Kemp—Kasten owing to the indexed depreciation schedules in excessof
economicdepreciation. The Treasury plans and Bradley-Gephardt would also
more than remove the bias against inventories, the Treasury plans through
their indexation of inventory gains and Bradley-Gephardt by its generally
unfavorable treatment of depreciable assets. The bias in favor of utili-
ties tends to shrink in all cases owningtothe removal of the investment
tax credit, but the rental cost declines nevertheless under Treasury II,
especially, Kemp—Kasten because of their exceptionally generous depreciation
allowances.
The plans differ the most, however, in their treatment of owner—occupied
housing. Under current law, the rental cost of this housing is over 3
percentage points higher for households with adjusted gross income of $17,500
than for households with AGI of $130,000. All reforms would narrow this
difference, but the spread is still nearly 2 percentage points under Treasury II
and 1½ points under Treasury I. With Bradley—Gephardt and Kemp—Kasten, the
spread is only one—third point. Treasury I would also sharply increase the bias
in favor of all owner—occupied housing by its indexation of interest expense for
all investments except owner—occupied housing, and Bradley—Gephardt would
increase the bias by its generally unfavorable treatment of depreciable assets.
We next examined the sensitivity of the tax regimes to inflation by
computing the changes in asset categories when the expected inflation rate
increases from zero to ten percent. Kemp—Kasten is close to inflation neutral;
only inventories change by more than one percent and there the change is only 3—27—
percent. Treasury I is even less neutral than current law, owing to its
exclusion of home mortgage interest expense from the interest indexation
provision. Treasury II and Bradley—Gephardt are significantly more neutral than
current law, but each contains a strong bias against owner—occupied housing,
because interest is deducted at a much lower tax rate by owners than by other
business, and in favor of depreciable real estate.
Lastly, we considered endogenous supply of capital responses ——apositive
elasticity of domestic and net foreign saving to increases in the relevant real
after—tax interest rates. The domestic and foreign responses are offsetting
under Treasury II and Kemp—Kasten, leading us to believe that the computed
interest rate effects are appropriate. The expected interest rate declines in
response to Treasury I and Bradley—Gephardt could be smaller than those computed
with the fixed—capital stock model.—28—
FOOTNOTES
l.This does not mean we believe the plans to be revenue—neutral. In
particular, Kemp—Kasten clearly is not. We analyze it nonetheless because its
proinvestment features are unique among the reforms.
2.We do not consider the impact of imperfect loss offsets. For an analysis of
these and other details of corporate taxation, see Auerbach (1983).
3.This is only true, of course, if the i's in equation (1) are the same for all
assets. In fact, the i'S are zero for owner—occupied housing. Given this
fact, expensing for depreciable assets and the nondeductibility of property
taxes on owner—occupied housing would lead to tax neutrality ——p—d=rfor
both depreciable assets and owner—occupied housing ——butsetting tax
depreciation equal to economic depreciation would not.
4.Optimal bond trading is discussed in Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984).
Other sources of the low implicit yield in longer—term tax exempts are the
greater risk of losses due to default and call on municipals relative to
Treasuries and the 80 percent limitation of the portion of interest on
indebtedness to carry tax exempts that commercial banks can deduct.
5.Sixty percent of owning households with incomes under $15,000 in 1983 had
house—to—income ratios exceeding 4, suggesting that the households were
retired, and did not have a mortgage. In contrast, eighty percent of owning
households with incomes over $25,000 had mortgages and only five percent with
incomes above $25,000 had house—to—income ratios above 4.6.The National Association of Homebuilders (1985, p.51) assumes a 14 percent
value for e whenis six percent. This inflation rate translates into a tax—
exempt rate just above 8 percent in our model and thus a risk premium of about
6 percent. Price—Waterhouse has used an e of 16 percent in their calculations.
7.Hendershott (1981) discusses why midway values would be expected.
8.The impact of (l—b) on p is (l—TZ)/(l—T) (l+ir),ignoringthe effect on z.
The impact on p—I, the risk—adjusted hurdle rate, is thus [T(l—z)—lr(l—T)]/(l—
T)(l+Tr).With z == 0.5,the two and a half percentage point greater (1—b)J
for risky assets raises p—by just over a percentage point.
9.The model is both an extension and simplification of that used by Hendershott
and Shilling (1982) to analyze the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The
extension is a more detailed treatment of nonresidential capital; the
simplificationis an exogenous specification of risk premia.Gravelle(1985)
uses a somewhat similar model to analyze Treasury I.




1983 were, by five
.319) 25—29 (.586
(The .273 for the
For older married
already shown up in younger, more mobile households. For
under 40, the decline in ownership rates between 1980 and
year age category: 14—19 (.273 to .168), 20—24 (.361 to
to .522) ,30—34(.752 to .697) and 35—39 (.826 to .786)
14—19 category is for 1978, when this ownership rate peaked.)
households, ownership rates have been constant or have risen.—30—
12.The Treasury would assume a real interest rate of 6 percent and allow the
deduction of (or would tax) only 6/(6+Tr) of interest paid (or earned) ,whereir
isthe actual inflation rate in a tax year. Thus if inflation were 5 percent,
only 55 percent of interest would be taxed and deducted. With zero inflation,
all interest would be taxed and deducted; with 10% inflation only 38 percent
would.(However, mortgage interest outlays on one's principal residence would
be fully deductible.)
l3.The differences are also somewhat sensitive to b If r —xis large and to T
— r.,whichis over 0.1 for Kemp—Kasten.
14.Deductibility of home mortgage interest (and state and local taxes?) at the
lowest 15 percent rate, a la Bradley—Gephardt, would enhance the efficiency
aspects of the Treasury plans.
15.This statement would seem to be at variance with the sharp shift to
homeownership in the 1970s. The latter occurred because interest rates did not
fully reflect expected general inflation and expected house price inflation
likely far exceeded expected general inflation.
16.If Kemp—Kasten were made revenue neutral by increasing tax rates (marginal
and average) on capital income, the decline in interest rates would be less.—31—
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Table 1
Tax Rates Relevant to Housing Decisions Under Current Law
______ Quantity_Demanded ______________
FederalState Total
17,500 .14 .03 .166 .147
27,500 .16 .035.189 .210
40,000 .18/.22 .04 .232 .279
70,000 .28/.33 .05 .340 .390
Income Tenure Choice




















17,500 — .015 .0548 .0616 .0708
27,500 — .015 .0536 .0589 .0666
40,000 — .015 .0529 .0539 .0588
70,000 — .015 .0462 .0415 .0397
130,000 — .015 .0411 .0299 .0219
*Measured as p—d, less 0.025 for corporate assets andnoncorporate equipment
to adjust for their assumed greater risk. Data fornoncorporate business
investments are in parentheses.
—34—
Table2
Net (of Depreciation) Risk—Adjusted































Private Capital Stock in the U.S. at the End of 1983









10—Year Public 138 2.0
Utilities
15—Year Public 322 4.7
Utilities
Other Corporate 546 7.9
Noncorporate 628 9.2
Rental Housing 624 9.2
Corporate 70
Noncorporate 553
Owner—Occupied Housing 2269 33.4
6793 100.0
Sources: Data for all assets except inventories and public utilities are from
Musgrave (1984). The inventory data are from the Federal Reserve (1984) and
the public utility data are based on the fractions given in Gravelle (1982),
i.e., 28 percent of nonresidential structures are public utilities and 33
percent of these have a 10—year tax life.—36—
Table 4
Assumed Distribution of Owner and Rental Housing
Across Six Income Classes
Owner—
Income HouseholdsFraction% of Income % of Income Occupied Rental
Range (millions) that Ownof Owners of RentersHousingHousing
(thousands)
less than 12½ 9.6 0 0 10 79
l2½—25 24 .578 14 19 248 162
25—30 12 .614 12 13 211 116
30—50 22.4 .657 33 32 639 281
50—100 9.6 .739 28 19 601 161
over 100 2.4 .785 13 7 333 61




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tax Rates Related to Households
Income Current Bradley— Kemp— Treasury
Level Law Gephardt Kasten I II
17,500 .166 .166 .27 .18 .18
(.147) (.068) (.159) (.115)(.120)
27,500 .189 .170 .275 .185 .185
(.210) (.099) (.222) (.138) (.149)
40,000 •232a .174 .28 .19 .19
(.279) (.139) (.265) (.166)(.204)
70,000 •340b .183 .29 .30 .30
(.383) (.204) (.286) (.274)(.292)
130,000 .455 .192 .30 .41 .41
(.450) (.208) (.294) (.367)(.386)
Maximum Rates
Interest Income(t. )C53 .342 .30 .41 .41
Real Equity(t)
''
.0742 .0941 .0555 .l12
.0667
Tax Exempts(x) .322 .210 .245 .081 .231
Deductibility of
Property Taxes Yes Yes Yes No No
a)Average of 0.213 and 0.251 used for the $30,000 to $50,000 income range;
the rate jumps around $38,000.
b)Average of 0.316 and 0.364 used for the $50,000 to $100,000 income range;
the rate jumps around $66,000.
c)These are the rates at which interest income is taxed (real interest under Treasury
I ).Therate at which business (noncorporate) interest expense would be deducted
is lower under Kemp—Kasten and the Treasury plans, 0.2856 and 0.389 respectively,
owing to the state and local offset at the Federal level.
d)This rate varies with the expected inflation rate because x (—O.3)Tf and B =




Present Value of Depreciation Deductions
for Corporate and Noncorporate Assets*
(Inflation Rate Equals 5%)
Current Treasury I Treasury IIBradley— Kemp—
Law Gephardt Kasten
Equipment
3 year .868 .853 .915 .885 .933
(.876) (.870) (.922) (.893) (.936)
5 year .782 .705 .836 .711 .898
(.795) (.734) (.850) (.728) (.902)
Structures
10 year .622 .542 .807 .560 .770
15 year .507 .415 .749 .440 .710
18 year .483 .292 .428 .350 .669
(.587) (448) (.609) (.434) (.845)
Nominal After—Tax
Discount Rate
Corporate .1264 .1308 .1301 .1281 .1345
Noncor. Equ. .1170 .1200 .1226 .1180 .1321
Real Estate .0843 .0915 .0922 .0889 .1055
*Noncorporate values are in parentheses.—40— 19a
Table 8
Interest Rates and Risk—Adjusted Net Rental
(Expected Inflation Rate of 5%)
Current Treasury Treasury
I
*Measured as p—d, less 0.025 for corporate
adjust for their assumed greater risk.






Interest Rates .11 .0800 .1012 .0911 .1106
Inventories .0806 .0616 .0609 .0698 .0800
Equipment
Corporate .0510 .0914 .0731 .0831 .0705
Noncorporate .0428 .0784 .0651 .0701 .0620
Structures
Utilities (15 yrs).0822 .0957 .0699 .0856 .0795
Industrials .0992 .0965 .0870 .0847 .0787
Commercial and
Rental (Noncorp.).0618 .0640 .0577 .0568 .0580
Owner—Occupied Housing
17,500 .0616 .0398 .0548 .0466 .0503
27,500 .0589 .0395 .0544 .0461 .0498
40,000 .0539 .0391 .0539 .0442 .0492
70,000 .0415 .0320 .0443 .0437 .0482
130,000 .0299 .0249 .0357 .0432 .0472—41—
Table 9
Reallocation of Capital When Inflation is 5 Percent
(Percentage Change)
Treasury I Treasury II Bradley— Kemp—
Gephardt Kasten
Inventories 2 2 1 0
Equipment —15 —9 —12 —8
Utility —9 7 —3 0
Structures
Industrial 2 9 10 15
Sti utuLe5
Commercial —2 5 6 4
Structures
Residential 9 0 3 0
Structures
Detail on Housing:
Change in Home .078 —.025 —.001 —.026
Ownership Rate
Percentage Change in
Rental —33 7 2 8
Owner 28 —3 4 —4—42—
Table 10
Percentage Changes in Capital in Response to an Increase in
Expected Inflation from Zero to Ten Percent
Current Law Treasury I Treasury II Bradley Kemp—
Gephardt Kasten
Inventories —3 —2 —l -2
Equipment —8 —6 —l —5 1
Utility —8 —11 —3 —6
Structures
Industrial —4 —12 —3 —3 1
Structures
Commercial 18 —6 12 9 0
Structures
Housing 4 8 —1 2 0
di/dTr 1.48 1.16 1.47 1.28 1.45
Change in Home
Ownership Rate —.100 .049 —.113 —.058 —.029—43—
23a
Table 11
Interest Rates Under Alternative Saving Assumptions
(Rate assumed to be 0.11 in absence of reforms)
Fixed Capital Constant Real
Stock Alloca— Tax—Exempt
tion Model Yield (10 Yr.)
Treasury I .0800 .0812
Treasury II .1012 .0970
Bradley— .0911 .0944
Gephardt
Kemp— .1106 .0988
Kasten